Abstract
Introduction
To support further discovery and research with agronomic high-consequence animal pathogens, ISU constructed and commissioned an ABSL-3 facility, with final thirdparty verification in March, 2010, following the recommendations of the Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories (5th edition) (BMBL) and the National Institutes of Health (NIH) Guidelines. The ISU Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory (VDL) uses this facility for necropsy of animals brought to the lab for diagnosis of ailments.
ABSL-3 spaces are used for work with laboratory animals infected with agents that are transmitted via aerosols and that may cause serious or fatal disease. Preventing the aerosolized agents from escaping the facility and impacting the environment is accomplished through the use of cascading levels of negative air pressure within the facility and high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filtration of facility exhaust air. Each successive room within an ABSL-3 facility is designed to maintain a negative pressure relative to the space adjacent to it, with the most negative space being the space that is likely to be the most contaminated. ABSL-3 facilities at ISU are designed so that air pressure reversals will not occur under failure conditions.
The BMBL recommends annual verification of an ABSL-3 facility's design and operational procedures (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2009 ). The review of records, physical inspection, and engineering tests performed to assess the ABSL-3 facility during initial and annual verification are intended to confirm containment and proper pressure differentials between internal adjacent spaces. Failure mode testing is used to test the ability of the facility to reach a static state without air pressure reversal when mechanical systems fail. At ISU, failure mode testing is included as part of verifying a facility's operations.
The current scheme of failure mode testing has its origins in the Process Failure Mode and Effects Analysis first developed by the U.S. Department of Defense in 1949 (DoD, 1949 . This testing method has been adapted over the decades to many industries and endeavors with great success (Bowles, 2012; Dussault, 1983) . This testing is used to assess the biocontainment capability and performance of a laboratory or animal facility when a building's mechanical system is deactivated or fails.
This report summarizes the first annual re-verification that was completed to ensure that the standard operating procedures (SOPs), administrative controls, facility physical structure, specialized equipment, and design and operational parameters continue to meet the recommendations of the NIH Guidelines and the BMBL, 5th edition. Prior to reverification, the facility had operated for approximately 11 months without unexpected alarms related to air pressure differentials within the facility. Figure 1 shows the general layout and floor plan of the ISU VDL ABSL-3 facility with the areas shaded in yellow defining the 2,942 ft 2 ABSL-3 containment space. The ABSL-3 area includes the BSL-3 laboratory, necropsy floor with two animal holding stalls, a walk-in freezer, necropsy/ BSL-3 lab anteroom, and a decontamination room. An additional 852 ft 2 interior animal receiving dock can be sealed off and configured into containment space as needed.
Materials and Methods

Facility
Doors within the facility have intentional gaps around them to allow for airflow and to ensure proper operation of door closing devices. A ceiling rail and pulley system, traversing from the animal receiving dock to necropsy and into the walk-in freezer, is used to move large animals within the facility (Figure 1 ). This not only facilitates movement, but also provides significant gaps at each threshold through which air moves between spaces. A rubber "boot" type gasket surrounds the rail where it intersects the doorways restricting airflow, but does not seal the door completely. Visual indicators of the pressure differences between spaces (magnehelic gauges) are mounted on the wall at the entrance to each space within the facility allowing occupants to confirm that the pressure differences are adequate prior to entering a space. Within the facility audible alarms alert occupants in the event of a loss of negative pressure.
Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) System and Pressure Differentials
The HVAC system of the ABSL-3 facility consists of two separate computer-controlled, interlinked, and synchronized supply and exhaust subsystems. Redundant exhaust fans remove air from the facility. Each fan operates at approximately 50% of capacity and, in the event of a failure, is programmed to ramp up to 100% capacity to maintain air pressure. Exhaust air is evacuated from the facility through welded stainless-steel ductwork fitted with HEPA filtration. As the exhaust air leaves the facility roof top, it is passed through a set of high-volume roof-top exhaust fans that propel the filtered exhaust air above the facility.
Conditioned supply air for the facility is provided by a single HVAC unit. To maintain pressure differences between spaces, the building automation system (BAS) provides the electronic controls for the interlocking and synchronization of the supply and exhaust system.
Air pressures become more negative as one moves inward within the facility (indicated by the arrows in Figure  1 inches of water (inH 2 O) pressure differential between adjoining spaces. This results in a cascade of negative air pressure from the space nearest the personnel entrance/exit inward to the working space, which is the area that is most likely to be contaminated. In this facility there are three pressure zones, designated A, B, and Ante, as seen in Figure 1 . The pressure differential between zone A and outside containment is set to approximately -0.05 inH 2 O. The pressure differential between zone A and zone B is set to an additional -0.05 in-H 2 O for a total of -0.10 inH 2 O relative to outside containment. This pressure differential was balanced and confirmed during commissioning of the facility, during thirdparty verification, and is scheduled to be verified annually.
All spaces have both supply air ducts and exhaust air ducts with the exception of the space labeled "Ante" in Figure 1 . This small space is an anteroom serving as a buffer area between the locker room, necropsy, and BSL-3 lab. It relies completely on air being drawn into and through it by the more negatively pressurized (-0.10 inH 2 O) areas adjacent to it in the facility.
Verification
Prior to beginning verification of the VDL ABSL-3 facility, all operations within the facility were terminated and all floors, walls, equipment, and surfaces within the facility were decontaminated using an appropriate contact disinfectant. Arrangements were made with third-party contractors to re-certify the biosafety cabinets and HVAC HEPA filters during the shutdown. Additionally, coordination with ISU Facilities, Planning & Management (FP&M) staff ensured that inspection and maintenance of the utilities and physical structure of the facility were accomplished and any deficiencies identified were corrected during the shutdown.
The SOPs for the facility operations were updated by the occupants and reviewed by VDL administration and ISU Biosafety personnel.
With the records review portion of the verification complete, ISU Biosafety personnel proceeded with the verification of engineering controls and equipment. The safety shower and eyewash station were checked for documentation of periodic flushes. The silicone caulk used to fill penetrations in the decontamination room was checked for leaks, and the performance of the effluent decontamination system and autoclave was validated.
Air pressure between spaces was measured using DP-CALC™ Micromanometer, Model 5825 (TSI, St. Paul, MN) devices. These micromanometers are capable of measuring differential and static pressure from -15 to +15 inH 2 O with data logging and time stamps and are accurate to ±1% of a reading ±0.005 inH 2 O. The devices record dif-
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Figure 2
Baseline pressure readings taken when the facility was operating in normal mode.
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ferences in pressure between spaces by monitoring the ambient room pressure in one space through an air intake port and the air pressure in an adjoining space through a 1.2 m rubber tube connected to a second air intake port and passed under the door. During this verification, differential pressure between spaces was logged and downloaded to a spreadsheet for analysis. The micromanometers were calibrated by a thirdparty contractor within a year of verification and confirmed to be within original tolerances.
Eight micromanometers were used during the initial third-party verification and annual internal verification of the VDL ABSL-3 facility. The readers were placed in doorways between adjoining spaces (depicted by red lines in Figure 1 ). Particular attention was paid to monitoring the room pressure in and around the space labeled "Ante." Because the BAS lacks direct control of the air within the anteroom, it was essential to conduct failure tests to check whether this space maintained negative pressure.
Failure Mode Tests
Failure mode tests were conducted by ISU Biosafety personnel, VDL personnel, and FP&M facility mechanics and Iowa State University's contracted building automation systems (BAS) technicians. The failure mode testing conducted during this verification mirrored the testing done at verification the previous year. The failure modes tested were initiated with the facility in normal operating mode. Baseline data were taken for 5 minutes to determine the normal pressure differentials within the facility. After each individual failure mode test, the facility was returned to normal operating status and allowed to equilibrate for approximately 5 minutes before initiating the next test. The failure mode tests were conducted sequentially with a single deployment of micromanometers. The failure tests conducted on the BAS included: 1. Exhaust fan 1 failure and restart 2. Exhaust fan 2 failure and restart 3. Exhaust fans (1 and 2) failure together and restart 4. Supply air handling unit failure and restart 5. Total electrical power failure and switch to emergency backup generator power and restart
The failure tests were done by manually turning off the fans or supply unit switch, waiting until the air pressures within the facility stabilized, and then manually turning the fans or supply unit switch back on.
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Figure 3
Pressure reading taken during the failure of exhaust fan 1.
Results and Discussion
Baseline Figure 2 illustrates the baseline pressure readings within the ABSL-3 facility. In normal operating mode the facility showed minor fluctuation in pressure, but maintained adequate inward negative pressure at all times. The spaces within the facility grouped into three zones: -0.05 inH 2 O, -0.10 inH 2 O, and near neutral. The space that was near neutral was the anteroom between necropsy and the BSL-3 lab. Since this space does not have exhaust or supply air vents, increasing the negative pressure in the space could be accomplished only indirectly by increasing the negative air pressure in the adjacent spaces resulting in unbalanced pressure between the spaces. Figure 3 presents the pressure readings during the failure of exhaust fan 1. The BSL-3 lab experienced a pressure reversal of +0.07 inH 2 O toward the decontamination room for approximately 30 seconds. It then slowly recovered, eventually becoming negative to the decontamination room and continued to an excessively negative state before recovering to a steady state. Likewise, the decontamination room experienced a pressure reversal of +0.02 inH 2 O for 6 seconds toward the support lab, which is outside containment, and then recovered and became excessively negative prior to stabilizing. The pressure reversal from the decontamination room to the support lab coincided with the much stronger pressure reversal from the BSL-3 lab, which could have resulted in a breach of containment in an occupied facility. On the other side of the facility, the necropsy anteroom experienced a pressure reversal of +0.11 inH 2 O to necropsy. The facility did not perform to specification or as in the previous verification.
Exhaust Fail Tests
The response of the facility to the failure of exhaust fan 2 gave data similar to the failure of exhaust fan 1. Figure 4 displays a pressure reversal from the BSL-3 lab to the decontamination room of +0.05 inH 2 O for approximately 30 seconds, as well as a reversal of pressure from the decontamination room to the support lab outside containment of +0.06 inH 2 O for approximately 10 seconds. There was also a pressure reversal from necropsy holding to the necropsy anteroom of +0.04 inH 2 O for approximately 10 seconds. Figure 5 indicates that immediately upon shutting down both exhaust fans, a cascade effect of rising positive pressure swept through the facility. The threshold between the decontamination room and the support lab went positive with air pressures rapidly rising to +0.16 inH 2 O for 6 seconds. Subsequently, the monitor between the necropsy Figure 4 Pressure reading taken during the failure of exhaust fan 2.
anteroom and necropsy holding recorded an increase in air pressure of +0.177 inH 2 O, with air movement outward from necropsy holding strong enough that personnel in the area at the time of testing saw the doors between the spaces move and heard the rush of the air. Only two areas within the facility stayed negative when both exhaust fans were failed. Interestingly, those two spaces were from the necropsy anteroom to outside containment. Although the amount of time that the spaces stayed positive during the total exhaust failure was short (approximately 6 seconds), the amount of increase in positive pressure was very concerning.
Investigation, Repair, and Re-verification FP&M engineers and BAS technicians investigated the failure of the HVAC system. Many possible modes of air intrusion into the facility were investigated such as physically checking for proper air valve settings, confirming coordination between the supply air handling unit and the exhaust fans, adding decontaminating liquid to prevent air intrusion from dry plumbing traps, and mechanical failure of air valves.
After an exhaustive investigation that included physically checking for proper air valve movement when commanded by the BAS, it was discovered that multiple air valves were reporting to the system that the valves were actuated to restrict air flow within the system; however, they were not actually functioning as the automation system indicated. The air valves in the facility operate like baffles in the ductwork, effectively closing off the duct to restrict or prevent airflow through the duct. The BAS was instructing the controllers to energize the motors, but the motors were not closing the valves. The air valves are actuated by small electric motors connected by controllers to the BAS. The air valves are constantly adjusted by the BAS to maintain a proper pressure balance across the facility and rarely close completely. Consequently, switches to indicate open or closed were not included in the hardware design. Figure 6 shows the actuator in the bottom-right corner of the picture. Even though the BAS was sending a 0% airflow command to the valve, the valve continued to allow 800 cubic feet per minute (cfm) of airflow through it. Subsequent testing of all valves serving the facility revealed four actuators were not operating properly. New actuators were ordered and installed, set points adjusted, and the facility was rebalanced for air flows and pressure zones.
After all repairs were made and periodic maintenance completed, the facility was re-verified to comply with the NIH Guidelines and BMBL, 5th edition for ABSL-3 facilities and work resumed in the facility.
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Pressure reading taken during the failure of both exhaust fans. www.absa. Figure 6 Picture of a duct with an air valve. The arrow is pointing to the actuator with the moving set point adjustment apparatus.
Conclusion
The BMBL indicates that design and operational procedures must be tested prior to use and re-verified annually, but failure mode testing is not a requirement. For this reason other high-containment facilities may neglect this failure testing procedure. At ISU, failure mode testing of the HVAC system is an integral part of the annual reverification. Only during failure mode testing were the facility's mechanical deficiencies revealed. At some point after commissioning and the initial verification of this facility, two air valves malfunctioned. During normal operations directional pressure differentials were maintained satisfactorily. Because SOPs are written and administrative controls are put in place based on the expectation that engineering controls will accomplish containment, safety inside and outside the facility may be jeopardized when controls fail.
Although the automation system indicates to users that all of the mechanical parts of the facility are functioning correctly, additional troubleshooting and testing are essential in diagnosing problems in high-containment facilities. The problem in this facility is an excellent example of an equipment failure that occurred even though the BAS indicated everything was functioning correctly. This experience highlights that it is necessary to include failure mode testing to verify the operational integrity of high-containment facilities.
